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Abstract: In his 2004 presidential campaign, John Kerry, a Catholic, was threat-
ened with being denied Holy Communion because of his pro-choice voting record. 
This article investigates the extent to which communion denial impacted Catho-
lic elected officials and analyzes public attitudes regarding communion denial 
for Kerry. The results of our analysis suggest that, despite heavy media coverage, 
few bishops endorsed the communion denial and few pro-choice Catholic offi-
cials were threatened. While the data also indicate there are meaningful politi-
cal implications for public attitudes on communion denial, the tactic does not 
command support from many Catholics.
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Introduction
A half century ago, then-Senator John F. Kennedy (1998, p. 140) promised a 
roomful of skeptical Protestant ministers in Houston, Texas, that “if the time 
should ever come… when my office would require me to either violate my con-
science or violate the national interest, then I would resign the office… .” Making 
such an extraordinary promise during the last 2 months of his campaign dem-
onstrates the degree of difficulty Kennedy encountered concerning his Catholic 
faith. Three years earlier, William J. Brennan faced a similar level of skepticism 
during his confirmation hearing for the so-called “Catholic seat” on the Supreme 
Court (Clark 1995, pp. 109–111). Unlike Kennedy, Brennan promised that should 
his religious values conflict with the law, he would act in accordance with his 
oath of office and uphold the Constitution.1
1 While Kennedy’s approach to a potential conflict between conscience and public duty may 
have assuaged enough Protestant voters, Brennan’s pledge angered some Catholic leaders. The 
former dean of the Notre Dame Law School, Thomas Shaffer, has argued that when a Catholic 
judge privileges the Constitution above his faith, he has committed a form of idolatry (as cited in 
Levinson 2003, p. 215).
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Catholics have played an important if occasionally controversial role in 
American political history, from the development of the labor movement, the 
welfare state, and Prohibition to more recent debates over abortion and same-sex 
marriage (Appleby and Cummings 2012). Political science studies have demon-
strated that Catholic legislators (Tatalovitch and Schier 1993) and judges (Blake 
2012) tend to reflect their religious values in their votes. Catholic leaders have 
stated that Catholic public officials have an obligation to act in accordance with 
their faith. During the pontificate of John Paul II, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger 
(2002) issued a proclamation stating that Catholic elected officials would be ineli-
gible to receive communion if they supported pro-choice policies on abortion, a 
precedent that he continued as Pope (Benedict XVI 2007).
During the 2004 presidential campaign, this issue came to a head when John 
Kerry became the first Catholic nominee since Kennedy. In 2003, Archbishop Sean 
O’Malley of Boston stated that Catholic elected officials who support abortion 
rights should refrain from seeking communion of their own volition. Raymond 
Burke was installed as bishop of the Archdiocese of St. Louis just days after Kerry 
had won the nearby Iowa caucuses. One of Archbishop Burke’s first public state-
ments in his new position was that he would deny communion to Kerry (O’Connor 
2004). Bishop Michael Sheridan of Colorado Springs, widened the issues to include 
euthanasia, gay marriage, and stem cell research. Lawrence Cunningham, a theol-
ogy professor at Notre Dame, described these tactics as “the functional equivalent 
of excommunication” (as cited in Deam and O’Connor 2005).
Pro-choice Catholics have been active in American politics for decades. What, 
then, is the strategy of communion denial hoping to accomplish? The communion 
denial movement can be seen from a number of different perspectives. First, it 
could represent a strategy on the part of Catholic leaders to build their political 
influence by inserting themselves into the narrative of a political campaign involv-
ing a pro-choice Catholic candidate. Second, even if making threats over commun-
ion denial is unlikely to change the candidate’s political behavior on issues such 
as abortion, the communion denial strategy could be a strategy to prime Catholics 
(or even conservative Christian voters from other denominations) to elevate issues 
like abortion within their electoral calculus. Third, even if the communion denial 
strategy is inconsequential in terms of changing the vote-share of American Cath-
olic voters, it could have agenda-setting implications, either externally, in terms 
of public policy, or within the internal dynamics of the American Catholic Church.
Finally, it could represent an attempt to be even-handed in the Church’s expec-
tations of both Catholic political leaders and Catholic voters. The US Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (2007, p. 11) has also published a document urging Catholics to vote 
according to their religious values. This guide gives voters some discretion as to how to 
translate Catholic doctrine into platform planks or policy proposals. On some issues, 
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however, the voter guide limits the political options of Catholic voters. It states, “A 
Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who takes a position in favor of an intrinsic evil, 
such as abortion or racism, if the voter’s intent is to support that position.”
On the surface, the denial of communion represents a threat to the salva-
tion of Catholic politicians, but the real import of this controversy is the degree 
to which it affects voter perceptions of these candidates. This phenomenon and 
its political implications are under-studied within political science. How many 
bishops advocated communion denial? How many elected officials were targeted? 
Is there a strategic dimension to either of these choices? This article performs a 
content analysis of media coverage of the communion denial controversy, and it 
analyses public attitudes on communion denial as they related to John Kerry’s 
presidential campaign in 2004.
Assessing the Extent of Communion Denial
We begin with a content analysis of media coverage of communion denial stories. 
We performed a Lexis-Nexis Academic search that spanned the beginning of 
2004 to the end of 2012.2 Over that time-period, there were 786 different newspa-
per and newswire stories that chronicled communion denial threats made to 17 
elected officials. Of the 17, 11 were state and local officials. They included a state 
trial court judge, three state senators, one Republican mayor in Rudolph Giuliani 
(R-NY), and Governors Andrew Cuomo (D-NY), Gray Davis (D-CA), Mike Easley 
(D-NC), Jim McGreevey (D-NJ), Martin O’Malley (D-MD), and Kathleen Sebelius 
(D-KS). Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Congressmen David Obey 
(D-WI) and Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), and Senators Bob Casey (D-PA), John Kerry 
(D-MA), and Claire McCaskil (D-MO) round out the list.
There are some seemingly strategic patterns to the communion denial 
phenomenon. These Catholic elected officials hail from 14 different states rep-
resenting every region of the country. Several of these Catholic leaders had 
statewide constituencies in states that have recently been considered “battle-
ground states” or states where Democrats have historically had a difficult time 
winning. As third in the line of presidential succession, Nancy Pelosi was one of 
the most  recognizable figures in the Democratic Party until the election of Presi-
dent Obama.3 Senator John Kerry and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, of course, were 
2 The search was performed in the US Newspapers and Wires database with the terms “Catholic 
AND (denied OR denial OR deny) W/5 communion.”
3 Oddly enough, since John William McCormack became the first Catholic elected House Speaker 
in 1962, six of the last nine speakers have been Catholic, including the incumbent John Boehner.
674   William D. Blake and Amanda Friesen
presidential candidates when they encountered controversy with communion 
denial, and Governor O’Malley is a rumored presidential candidate for 2016.
However, there is also evidence that this movement never gained much 
momentum. Only a handful of bishops spoke out in favor of communion denial 
and some did so very reluctantly, after the issue had been forced into the national 
agenda. Some of the communion denial threats were made not by bishops but by 
priests at parishes were Catholic elected officials attended. According to Father 
Thomas Reese of the Woodstock Theological Center (as cited in Mulligan 2009), 
“In 2004, a large majority of bishops tried to persuade the minority not to do 
this: using Communion as a weapon.” After the 2004 campaign, communion 
denial lost most of its momentum. Of the 17 politicians threatened with commun-
ion denial, only six received their first threats after 2004, and the stories in 2004 
accounted for 57% of the coverage in our sample.
Public Attitudes on Communion Denial
American Catholics embrace an interesting cross-section of political attitudes. 
Early studies in policy attitudes (Williamson 1974) found that Catholics were 
more likely to support greater efforts to aid the poor compared to Protestants, 
which could be a historical consequence of the heavy concentration of American 
Catholics within the urban manual workforce (Allinsmith and Allinsmith 1948). 
Of course, these demographics may have changed over the past half century or 
so. Theologian Martin Marty has argued that the GI Bill helped elevate many 
American Catholics to the ranks of the middle class (Perry 2008, p. 164), and as 
Latinos become more active in American politics, the ethnic background of Cath-
olic America is changing as well. On the other hand, Catholics are much more 
conservative in their abortion attitudes than mainline Protestants (Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life 2013).
Catholics have traditionally been a key part of the Democratic Party coalition 
(Burnham 1965), but recent presidential candidates have not fared as well among 
Catholic voters. According to exit polling data, the only Democrat to win more than 
50% of the Catholic vote since 2000 was Barack Obama, but only in 2008 and only as 
a result of his overwhelming support among Latino voters. John Kerry actually per-
formed the worst among recent Democratic candidates, winning only 47% to George 
W. Bush’s 52% (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2012). Bush’s showing among 
Catholics may also be a result of his high standing with the Latino community (Pew 
Research Hispanic Trends Project 2012).
There are theoretical reasons to expect that the issue of communion denial 
would generate political repercussions among other religious communities, even 
The Politics of Denying Communion to Catholic Elected Officials   675
though communion denial has never been an issue in any Protestant denomi-
nation. Interdenominational religious conflict, especially antipathy directed at 
Catholics, was once the defining cleavage in American religious life. Since World 
War II, however, religious conflict has been much more of a function of compet-
ing doctrines within individual denominations (Wuthnow 1989). Simply put, we 
hypothesize that public attitudes on communion denial are much more likely 
to be shaped by underlying political and ideological viewpoints, rather than a 
simple reflection of American religious affiliation. In particular, because the com-
munion denial controversy has mainly taken place within the context of abortion, 
we expect to find a close correlation between predictors of anti-abortion attitudes 
and support for communion denial.
To test our hypotheses, we accessed the 2004 Religion and Public Life Survey, 
conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International.4 Using a 
random digit sample of telephone numbers, 1512 adults were surveyed between 
August 5 and 10, 2004.5 The respondents had an average age of 48, have had “some 
college” education, earned $50,000 to $60,000 a year, were 79% White and 52% 
female, though each of the models below were executed with the  weighting vari-
able included in the dataset.
Concerning our variable of interest, respondents were asked: “Do you believe 
that it is proper or improper for Catholic church leaders to deny communion to 
Catholic politicians whose views on abortion and other life issues go against 
church teachings?” Twenty-two percent of respondents indicated it was proper, 
64% improper, and 14% did not know. The variable was recoded so that those 
considering this action proper were assigned a “1,” those declaring it improper a 
“0,” and the “don’t know” answers were coded as missing.
One of our aims is to understand the individuals who believe this practice 
to be improper. A quick look at bivariate relationships between the communion 
variable and other demographic/political items shows an interesting pattern of 
results. As may be expected, there is a significant relationship between political 
ideology (self-reported on a 5-point scale, with higher numbers indicating more 
conservative) and support for communion denial (r = 0.24, p < 0.001), such that 
one is more likely to think it is proper to deny as one moves toward the conserva-
tive end of the ideological scale. The relationships between standard religiosity 
4 The data were downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, www.TheARDA.
com on October 28, 2013, and were collected by Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press.
5 For information on methodology and weighting, see http://www.people-press.org/2004/ 
08/24/gop-the-religion-friendly-party/2/#about-the-survey or http://www.thearda.com/Archive/
Files/Descriptions/RELPUB04.asp.
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variables and communion denial are also not surprising. The more important reli-
gion is in one’s everyday life (measured on a 3-point scale of not very important, 
fairly important, very important), the more likely one is to support communion 
denial (r = 0.18, p < 0.001).
A very similar effect is found for frequency of church attendance (r = 0.18, 
p < 0.001) and being “born again” (r = 0.19, p < 0.001), though the latter is interest-
ing in that Catholics do not typically consider themselves born again, indicating 
that evangelicals may have an opinion on this issue that occurs outside of their 
faith communities. There are no significant bivariate relationships between com-
munion denial attitudes and age, income, or education, though gender demon-
strates a small effect in that men are more likely to support communion denial 
(r = –0.12, p < 0.001).
Using the entire sample, we employed a logistic regression on commun-
ion denial attitudes with demographic, religiosity, and partisan covariates. The 
results are displayed in the first column of Table 1. The bivariate relationships 
hold when controlling for all other variables, such that the odds increase that 
one will support communion denial if one is male, more conservative, considers 
religion important in life and attends services more frequently. Interestingly, the 
odds decrease if a respondent considered himself a Democrat, even though most 
communion denials should occur among Democrat candidates who are both 
Catholic and pro-choice. The story from this model suggests that conservatism 
and higher levels of religiosity are predictive of views on church involvement in 
this political matter.
It is also possible that several of these variables are merely proxies for con-
servative attitudes on abortion. In order to control for this, we added a variable 
to the second model (in column 2 of Table 1), which asked respondents – on a 
4-point scale – the importance of the issue of abortion on vote choice. There is a 
significant bivariate relationship between communion denial attitudes and the 
abortion variable (r = 0.20, p < 0.001), but it is certainly not a high correlation nor 
akin to placing the same measure on both the right and left sides of the regression 
equation.
When abortion attitudes are included, gender and the religiosity variables 
are no longer significant predictors, though the sample size is cut in half, as 
the abortion question was not used in the entire sample. As expected, the more 
important abortion is to the individual, the greater the odds that they will support 
denial of communion to pro-choice candidates. Conservative ideology and non-
Democratic party identification remain significant positive predictors as well. 
Looking at the predictive probability of ideology, a person scoring a “5” or “very 
conservative” is twice as likely to support communion denial as an individual 
who is “very liberal” or a “1.”
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To pare down the analysis amidst religious traditions, we performed the 
same model on the Catholic sub-sample and what we deem an evangelical sub-
sample – those that indicated they were both Protestant and “born again.” The 
results are displayed in the last two columns of Table 1. Among Catholics, ideo-
logy and religious importance (p = 0.06) are the only variables that significantly 
predict communion denial attitudes, such that the more conservative one is 
politically and more importance one places on religion in day-to-day living, the 
greater the odds that one will support denial of communion. While holding all 
other variables at their means, the predicted probability of supporting commun-
ion denial doubles as one moves from selecting “not very important” (0.151) or 
“fairly important” (0.113) to “very important” (0.307).
In the evangelical sub-sample, only the political variables were significantly 
associated with communion, again with conservative ideology and non-Democratic 
party identification increasing the odds of supporting denial. These results confirm 
a cross-sectional finding: 35% of evangelical Protestants support communion 
denial, making them the most supportive religious sub-group.6 By contrast, only 
23% of Catholics support communion denial. While the communion denial con-
troversy is taking place entirely outside of their religious community, evangelicals 
support communion denial, most likely because it seems a way to show religious 
disapprobation for support of abortion rights, a salient issue in that community.
Next, we were interested in testing whether notions of communion denial 
would influence participant perceptions and support for Kerry. We used two 
items to assess this relationship: an indication of whether individuals would 
vote for Kerry in the upcoming election and a four-point favorability rating (the 
items correlated at 0.73, p < 0.001). These items loaded on one factor, using a prin-
ciple components analysis, and a Cronbach’s alpha-derived score was created 
using both variables to account for the shared variance (Θ = 0.85).7 Our aim here 
is not to provide a full explanation of Kerry vote share or favorability but rather 
to assess whether our variable of interest demonstrates a relationship with these 
measures.
In the first column of Table 2, religiosity, political, and demographic variables 
were regressed on the support for Kerry variable detailed above.8 Unsurprisingly, 
ideology and party identification were significant predictors, with the largest 
effects in the model (β = 0.117 and 0.367, respectively). Religious importance, 
attendance, and communion denial attitudes also were significantly related to 
Kerry support, though all three effects are very low (β = 0.062, 0.064, and 0.087, 
6 An ANOVA revealed a statistically-significant difference of groups at the p < 0.05 level.
7 Through Stata, we created the variable by “alpha viewkerry votekerry, gen (kerryness).”
8 Effect sizes were computed separately from the models and are not reported in the tables.”
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respectively). The latter two were negatively related to support for Kerry, in that 
higher attendance and support for denial of communion resulted in lower levels 
of support. Surprisingly, religious importance was positively related, such that 
increased importance is associated with more support for Kerry.
While additional analysis would be required to substantiate this theory, this 
last finding may demonstrate how differences in church attendance rates among 
religious denominations impact electoral behavior. John Kerry went on to win 
52% support from exit poll respondents who attended religious services only a 
few times a year (National Election Pool 2004). Thus, once a model controls for 
ideology and frequency of religious attendance, the religious importance variable 
may capture the attitudes of mainline Protestants or other infrequent churchgo-
ers, who nonetheless consider religion to be important to them.
Next, we performed this model on our religious affiliation sub-samples, as 
displayed in the last two columns of Table 2. Ideology and party identification 
have similar, significant predictive power and effect sizes as in the model on 
the full sample. Among Catholics, however, religious service attendance is not 
significant, and the effect sizes of religious importance (0.118) and communion 
denial attitudes (0.157) are still small but larger than in the full sample. None of 
the religiosity variables were significant in the evangelical sub-sample.
Again, with these small effect sizes, we are not suggesting that agreement 
or disagreement with communion denial had a demonstrable and sizable influ-
ence on the likelihood of voting for or favoring Kerry, but it is interesting that 
even with the presence of the traditional covariates, communion denial attitudes 
Table 2 Support for Kerry regressed on communion denial attitudes, religiosity, political  
orientations and demographics.
All 
 
Catholics 
 
Evangelicals
  Coeff. (S.E.)   p-Value Coeff. (S.E.)   p-Value Coeff. (S.E.)   p-Value
Age   0.000 (0.001)  0.832  –0.001 (0.003)  0.767  –0.001 (0.002)  0.806
Education   0.038 (0.025)  0.125  0.078 (0.049)  0.115  –0.033 (0.046)  0.472
Female –0.013 (0.048)  0.779  –0.018 (0.095)  0.849  0.068 (0.082)  0.409
Ideology –0.110 (0.028)  0.000  –0.110 (0.050)  0.029  –0.103 (0.050)  0.041
Democrat 0.675 (0.051)  0.000  0.671 (0.099)  0.000  0.832 (0.093)  0.000
Income –0.021 (0.010)  0.035  –0.028 (0.020)  0.164  –0.008 (0.017)  0.651
Religious Importance  0.083 (0.039)  0.034  0.160 (0.080)  0.046  0.092 (0.105)  0.380
Religious attendance   –0.042 (0.019)  0.030  –0.029 (0.040)  0.477  –0.030 (0.034)  0.379
Communion –0.164 (0.056)  0.003  –0.301 (0.112)  0.008  –0.025 (0.086)  0.773
Constant 1.207 (0.156)  0.000  1.043 (0.321)  0.001  0.961 (0.373)  0.010
Pseudo R2 0.209  0.242  0.281 
N 1150  295  352 
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contribute to the explanation of Kerry support. It is worth noting that the effect 
of communion denial attitudes on support for Kerry is not a result of priming and 
question ordering. The support for Kerry questions were asked at the beginning 
of the interview, while the communion denial questions were asked later. Thus, 
for those respondents who had not heard about the controversy, they could not 
utilize the knowledge gained from the interviewer to formulate their attitudes 
towards Kerry.
Conclusion
Archbishop Raymond Burke enjoyed a great deal of support from Pope Benedict 
XVI, which might be expected, given that the communion denial doctrine that 
Burke acted upon was written by Benedict. In 2009, the then-pontiff appointed 
Burke to a key Vatican post that assisted in the appointment of American bishops. 
Burke became the second-highest ranking American in the Vatican. The installa-
tion of Pope Francis has, in a short amount of time, brought a significant change 
in direction for the Catholic Church. The new Pope has lamented the Church’s 
recent “obsession” with abortion and other cultural issues. His attitudes on com-
munion eligibility are also markedly different from that of his predecessor. He 
(as cited in Goodstein 2013) stated: “The Eucharist, although it is the fullness of 
sacramental life, is not a prize for the perfect but a powerful medicine and nour-
ishment for the weak.”
In order for communion denial to reemerge as a source of religious and politi-
cal conflict in American life, it would seem a Catholic would need to become the 
standard-bearer of the Democratic Party in order to galvanize the issue onto the 
national agenda. In addition, such a reemergence would likely require support 
from more American bishops, as well support from the Vatican itself. Such 
support is unlikely from the current pontiff, given both his words and his actions. 
The story of Archbishop Burke has, in a way, come full circle. In December, 2013, 
Pope Francis removed him from the Congregation for Bishops (Religion News 
Service 2013).
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